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Abstract
As the prevalence of deep learning in computer vi-
sion, adversarial samples that weaken the neural
networks emerge in large numbers, revealing their
deep-rooted defects. Most adversarial attacks cal-
culate an imperceptible perturbation in image space
to fool the DNNs. In this strategy, the perturbation
looks like noise and thus could be mitigated. At-
tacks in feature space produce semantic perturba-
tion, but they could only deal with low resolution
samples. The reason lies in the great number of
coupled features to express a high-resolution im-
age. In this paper, we propose Attack by Identi-
fying Effective Features (AIEF), which learns dif-
ferent weights for features to attack. Effective fea-
tures, those with great weights, influence the victim
model much but distort the image little, and thus
are more effective for attack. By attacking mostly
on them, AIEF produces high resolution adversar-
ial samples with acceptable distortions. We demon-
strate the effectiveness of AIEF by attacking on dif-
ferent tasks with different generative models.
1 Introduction
Deep learning methods, especially deep neural networks
(DNN), have achieved extraordinary success in computer vi-
sion, natural language process and other fields in recent years
[LeCun et al., 2015]. Despite its great success, the mecha-
nism and mathematical theory of DNN have not been deeply
investigated. The lack of good understanding and interpre-
tation prevents the use of DNN in many applications with
a high requirement on reliability. One evidence that DNNs
are far from perfect is the existence of adversarial example,
which is first proposed by [Szegedy et al., 2014] and reveals
DNN’s defects by specifically customizing an image to cheat
a DNN to output false decision with high confidence.
Due to the over-sensitivity of the neural networks, an ad-
versarial sample that looks very similar to the original one
is incorrectly predicted. Traditional attack in image space
adds samples with semantically meaningless perturbation like
noise. This noise-based attack is the main stream of adver-
sarial attack [Goodfellow et al., 2015], [Carlini and Wagner,
2017], [Chen et al., 2018], [Su et al., 2019].
Given that, most defense methods against attack are to re-
strain the adversarial noise. Although noise-based attacks and
the related defense methods have achieved success in under-
standing and strengthening DNNs, it will be more interest-
ing to link the attack with semantic meanings, which could
greatly help feature analysis [Creswell et al., 2017], [Song et
al., 2018], [Tang et al., 2019]. On the contrary of noise-based
attack, we call the adversarial attack with semantic meaning
as feature-based attack, which reveals different information
in aspects of perturbation meanings and aggression compared
with noise-based attack as illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: An example for the difference between feature-based at-
tack and noise-based attack. On top, one could observe that in noise-
based attack, the change from original sample to the adversarial one
has no relation to the image content. Unlike noise-based attack, the
change of the feature-based attack is visible and meaningful but from
the view of the oracle, e.g., human annotators, the change could not
affect the decision but it indeed affects the victim DNN. They differ
in mechanism so that the samples from feature-based attack are im-
mune to defense methods for image-based attack (such as filtering).
In the view of understanding and analyzing DNNs, fea-
ture based attacks are more important and meaningful. How-
ever, the current feature-based attacks [Creswell et al., 2017],
[Song et al., 2018] are restricted to low resolution. The rea-
son lies in the great number of coupled features to express a
high-resolution image (for noise-based attack, there is no dif-
ference between high-resolution and low-resolution attacks).
In order to fill in the blank of high-resolution feature-based
attack, we propose Attack by Identifying Effective Features
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(AIEF). AIEF first encodes the image into features by opti-
mizing from the decoder. Then it attacks the features and si-
multaneously, learns the corresponding weights for perturba-
tions of features and therefore identifies effective features for
attack. Effective features, those with great learned weights,
influence the victim model much but distort the image little,
and thus are more effective for attack. With smaller weights,
ineffective features either have a little impact on the victim
model or controls crucial parts of the image, and they should
be kept constant during attack. The effective features AIEF
identifies by their weights are a little different from those in-
tuitively selected by human. By attacking mostly on effective
features, AIEF could generate high resolution samples (1024
or 512) for different tasks such as face verification and object
classification. In numerical experiments, it has been verified
that the perturbation calculated by AIEF has semantic mean-
ing and could not be eliminated by several defense methods.
The following sections are organized as below. In Section
2, the developments of related fields in recent years are in-
troduced. Section 3 describes Attack by Identifying Effective
Features is illustrated in detail. We demonstrate experimental
results on face verification and object classification in Section
4. Finally, Section 5 concludes our paper briefly.
2 Related Work
2.1 Noise-based attack
Adversarial attack, when first proposed [Szegedy et al.,
2014], was solved as an optimization problem in image space,
which consumes much time. To output samples more ef-
fectively, [Goodfellow et al., 2015] developed Fast Gradient
Sign Method (FGSM) to compute adversarial perturbation,
and it works well in even one step. [Carlini and Wagner,
2017] proposed C&W to restrict l0, l2 and l∞, which serves
as an overwhelming attacking method for defensive distilla-
tion. [Chen et al., 2018] formulated the process of attack-
ing DNNs as an elastic-net regularized optimization problem.
Interestingly, [Su et al., 2019] adopted generic algorithm to
achieve one-pixel attack, which alters only one pixel in the
image to cheat the DNN.
2.2 Defense methods for attack
To defend noise-based attacks, various methods are broadly
proposed. The direct way to improve network’s robustness is
to retrain it in an adversarial way [Ganin et al., 2016] [Shri-
vastava et al., 2017]. The second method is to fundamentally
modify the network structure [Xie et al., 2019]. The last tech-
nique, the easiest one to implement, is to take a further step
to eliminate the adversarial noise before input as the case in
[Liu et al., 2019] [Xie et al., 2018], [Prakash et al., 2018].
Despite their success in noise-based attack, they tend to fail
faced with feature-based attack.
2.3 Feature-based attack
Different from noise-based attacks, feature-based attacks are
recently proposed. [Creswell et al., 2017] changed the frame-
work of variational autoencoder to calculate additive and mul-
tiplicative perturbation. This attack alters latent feature vec-
tors in a minimum degree so output of the classifier remains
the same, but the decoded images belong to different classes.
[Song et al., 2018] used AC-GAN to construct unrestricted
adversarial samples in low resolution. Since it uses the auxil-
iary classifier (AC) as an oracle to guarantee that the samples
remain in the same class in view of human, AC must be for
the same task as the victim network. New AC-GANs have to
be trained for new tasks and tasks beyond classification could
not be achieved. In [Tang et al., 2019], Type I attack was
discussed compared to the traditional Type II attack. Type I
attack cheats the classifiers with significant changes, but the
output of victim model remains unchanged. It demonstrates
high resolution samples for Type I attack, but we provide
Type II ones that look similar to original ones.
2.4 Generative models in attack
To realize adversarial attack in feature space, a decoder to
generate image from latent feature space is required. The
thriving of the generative model contributes greatly to the
growing of feature-based attack. Variational autoencoder
(VAE) [Kingma and Welling, 2014] and generative adversar-
ial network (GAN) [Goodfellow et al., 2014] are two main-
stream approaches. As for their usage in attack, feature-based
one tends to use VAE since the distribution in latent space
is constrained to standard normal. But the image VAE gen-
erates is vague with blurry edge compared to GAN. In our
work, we implement AIEF on the latest StyleGAN [Karras
et al., 2019] with 1024*1024 output and BigGAN [Brock et
al., 2019] with 512*512 output. AIEF can also be applied to
other GAN structure readily.
2.5 Explain the adversarial attack
Given the threat of adversarial attack, many researches pro-
vide explanations for them. [Dong et al., 2019], [Zhang and
Zhu, 2019] found that the attack influences the attention of
DNNs, which may account for the aggression of adversarial
samples. Another thriving topic is to study the boundary of
attack’s threat and therefore certify the robustness of DNNs
[Cohen et al., 2019], [Salman et al., 2019]. By this way, the
degree of aggression or robustness could be theoretically cal-
culated. [Ilyas et al., 2019] interpreted adversarial samples
as a result of learning from non-robust features, which are
defined in image space and disentangled from robust ones
by optimization in encoding. They are falsely exploited by
DNNs to increase accuracy, which reveals their poor general-
ization. Differently, our effective features are defined in latent
space and identified during adversarial attack, which are ef-
fective for attack and reveal the over-sensitivity of DNNs.
3 Attack by Identifying Effective Features
In this section, we would describe and analyse AIEF in detail.
The loss functions for attack and identifying effective features
are first introduced. Then, procedures of AIEF are illustrated.
We would lastly identify effective features and analyse how
they influence the attack.
3.1 Method
The intuitive idea for attack is to change the output of the vic-
tim network while keeping image perturbation small. How-
ever, direct imposing these two purposes on feature space
may result to an unacceptable image distortion. This phe-
nomenon is even more prominent for high resolution images
because of the great number of features to express a high-
resolution image. For example, 20 latent features would be
enough to represent a 28*28 gray-scale digit number in VAE,
but a 1024*1024*3 image requires 18*512 features to express
in StyleGAN. Manually selecting features to attack is also im-
practical because they are coupled in most cases. To achieve
high-resolution attack, we propose Attack by Identifying Ef-
fective Features (AIEF) as in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Illustration of AIEF. Blue lines are for calculation and
red lines are for optimization. In encoding, z is optimized by Limg
to project xori into latent space. In attacking, ∆z is optimized to
produce adversarial samples. Simultaneously, feature weights σi are
learned for an acceptable image perturbation, which is the basis for
identifying effective features.
In AIEF, the key idea is to learn different weights, denoted
as σi, for different feature perturbations ∆zi. The weights
correspond to the effectiveness of the features in attack and
therefore serve as the basis for feature identification. σ is
normalized by its sum before multiplied with the feature per-
turbation ∆z in the element-wise way. The overall strategy
to generate adversarial samples is
x = dec
(
z +
σ∑n
i=1 σi
·∆z
)
, (1)
where x is the adversarial sample, z is the original features
need to be obtained by encoding from the decoder dec.
The procedure could be divided into encoding and attack-
ing. To conduct feature-based attack, one should first encode
the sample into latent space. Rather than training a new en-
coder, we conduct this process by optimizing Limg, which
does not consume much time. After encoding, the corre-
sponding z for the original images is obtained and fixed in
the following steps.
In attacking, we optimize Lprd on ∆z for fooling the vic-
tim network as other methods do. Differently, we also period-
ically optimize Limg to modify σ, the corresponding weights
for the perturbation in latent space. After several iterations,
effective features with larger weights are identified.
The crucial scheme is to optimize ∆z for false prediction
and optimize σ for an acceptable image distortion separately.
The former loss Lprd is specified for different tasks and Limg
Algorithm 1 Attack by Identifying Effective Features (AIEF)
Input: victim network f , prediction loss L(f, x), original
sample xori, encoding loss threshold e, maximum attack
iteration m, optimization proportion p
Output: adversarial sample x
1: # Encode
2: Let z = random normal(), Limg = |dec(z)− xori|
3: while Limg ≥ e do
4: x = dec(z)
5: Limg = |x− xori|
6: z = z − Γ(∂Limg∂z )
7: end while
8:
9: # Attack
10: Let iter = 0, σ = 1, ∆z = 0
11: while iter < m do
12: x = dec(z + σ∑n
i=1 σi
·∆z)
13: Limg = |x− xori|
14: σ = σ − Γ(∂Limg∂σ )
15: if iter%p == 0 then
16: Lprd = L(f, x)
17: ∆z = ∆z − Γ(∂Lprd∂∆z )
18: end if
19: iter = iter + 1
20: end while
21: return x
is defined in pixel-wise absolute difference. They are ex-
pressed as
Lprd = L(f, x),
Limg = |x− xori|, (2)
where xori stands for the original clean sample.
As summarized in Algorithm 1, the encoding before attack
is also done easily with no additional encoder. In attacking,
σ truly serves as weights given that magnitude of ∆z is rel-
atively similar. The features with great weights are called
effective features for attack. AIEF selects them as good can-
didates for attack, which means changes in them influence
the prediction of the victim model a lot, but do not distort
the decoded image much. In contrast, features with small
weights are ineffective features. Modifications on them are
either unnecessary for false prediction or dangerous for large
distortion.
According to the weights learned during the attack, one
could then abandon the ∆zi for ineffective features in pursuit
of a smaller distortion but also maintain good attack perfor-
mance. Analysis on this feature identification would be thor-
oughly illustrated in the next subsection.
3.2 Analysis
We study the weights distribution and their affects by taking
StyleGAN [Karras et al., 2019] as the decoder, and FaceNet
[Schroff et al., 2015] as the victim model. Here, we study
about whether the feature weights reflect their real influence
Figure 3: Analysis of the feature weights in AIEF. The top bar shows
the magnitude of feature weights in different hierarchies. The su-
perficial features influence little to the prediction while the crucial
features influence too much on the image, so features between them
are learned as effective ones for attack. In controlling the ratio of
functional feature perturbation with the greatest weights, the clean
samples gradually grow into the adversarial ones. Slight changes
induced by ineffective features (when R is large) focus on the most
superficial features, i.e., blurriness and light, and the most crucial
features, i.e., expression and facial features, which corresponds to
their hierarchy as in the top bar.
in attack and how features with different weights influence
the attack. All Results are demonstrated in Figure 3 and we
would illustrate it in the remaining section.
StyleGAN has a hierarchy of features from crucial to su-
perficial ones, which respectively control key or irrelevant
parts of the image as specified in the structure. We adopt
this setting in StyleGAN for analysing the hierarchy of ef-
fective features identified in AIEF. The weights are generally
plotted at top of Figure 3, from which one could find that sub-
superficial features are most effective for attack. The reason is
that most superficial features have little influence on the pre-
diction of victim network while the crucial features impose
an unacceptable impact on the image.
To further study how features with different weights af-
fect the image and attack, we set the feature perturbations
∆zi to 0 for a proportion of features with the smallest weight
(most ineffective features) to conduct feature selection. Ex-
cept them, the perturbations for the remaining feature are still
functional. We denote the ratio of the remaining functional
features as R. R = 0 gives original samples since all pertur-
bations of features are set to 0. Those samples are shown on
the leftmost column in Figure 3. To evaluate on the attack,
other samples are matched with the clean sample by FaceNet.
An image is considered as an adversarial sample if it is not
matched with the original one. The attack would succeed just
if a small proportion of feature perturbations (for effective
features) are functional, which indicates the necessity to learn
different weights for different features.
For the decoded image, one could observe the slight
changes in the middle of Figure 3. As R gradually increases,
the decoded sample gradually grows aggressive and crosses
the decision boundary at some point. In this period, effective
features work and the sample quickly becomes an adversarial
one. As R continues to increase, influence of ineffective fea-
tures reveals. The resulting additional slight changes focus
on the most superficial features, i.e., blurriness and light, and
the most crucial features, i.e., expression and facial features,
which corresponds to previous analysis about the hierarchy
of ineffective features.
Note that we choose StyleGAN here because it expresses
a high-resolution image with hierarchy features as specified
in its structure. This property provides basis of analysing the
hierarchy of feature that AIEF identifies. AIEF could also be
applied to any generative models other than StyleGAN, i.e.,
BigGAN [Brock et al., 2019] as shown in the next section.
4 Experiment
In this section, we implement AIEF on StyleGAN (trained on
CelebA-HQ [Karras et al., 2017]) and BigGAN (trained on
ImageNet [Deng et al., 2009]) to generate adversarial sam-
ples. We set the parameters in Algorithm 1 as encoding loss
threshold e = 3.5, maximum attack iteration m = 100, opti-
mization proportion p = 2 for experiments below. Adam op-
timizer [Kingma and Ba, 2015] with β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999,
 = 10−8 is used.
We use well-trained victim models including FaceNet
[Schroff et al., 2015], ResNet152 [He et al., 2016],
DenseNet121 [Huang et al., 2017] and VGG19 [Simonyan
and Zisserman, 2015] implemented in TensorFlow [Abadi
et al., 2015] or PyTorch [Paszke et al., 2019]. 4 NVIDIA
GeForce RTX 2080Ti GPUs are used for computation.
It could be seen that AIEF is capable of feature-based high-
resolution attack for different tasks and these adversarial sam-
ples are immune to several defense methods.
4.1 AIEF on face verification
We first report the results of experiments on face verification,
which is relatively harder to attack. For the classification task,
the victim network could be fooled to produce any decision
other than the correct one. However, in face verification, the
embedding features of two images are extracted and matched
in distance. In this case, only feature extraction procedure
could be attacked. A common practice to attack on face veri-
fication is to fool network not to match two different images
of one person. Compared to that, we implement AIEF in a
more challenging scenario where adversarial sample has to
fool the victim not to match it with the original one.
We take the synthesis network in StyleGAN (1024*1024
output, trained on CelebA-HQ) as the decoder and FaceNet
as the victim model. StyleGAN has 18*512 features, on
which we conduct AIEF. We use the FaceNet pre-trained on
CelebA, which has 99.05% accuracy on LFW [Huang et al.,
2008] dataset. The same face alignment, pre-whitening, and
pre-processing operations are conducted as in [Schroff et al.,
2015]. We specify the prediction loss in face verification as
L(fface, x) = hReLU(1.6−Dface(x, xori)). (3)
Dface is calculated in the way FaceNet specified (below 1.242
for matching). It induces Dface to grow larger but saturates
when it is too large (exceeds 1.6). Adam learning rate is 0.2
for Limg and 0.005 for Lprd. The analysis in the last section
share the same setting, but here, we show the numerical and
image results for massive experiments.
The adversarial samples produced by AIEF are demon-
strated in Figure 4. One could observe that they differ from
the original samples only in a small semantic perturbation.
But FaceNet does not match them as the same person, and
outputs large distances far larger than the threshold.
Figure 4: AIEF on face verification. The first column is the orig-
inal clean samples. AIEF generates semantic perturbation in the
second column. The adversarial samples in the third column are
not matched with the original ones with a FaceNet distance of 1.59,
1.59, 1.61, 1.65 respectively. (below 1.242 for matching)
Table 1: Performance on AIEF for Face Verification
Dface RMSD
AIEF PGD AIEF PGD
R = 0.3 0.923 — 8.1463 —
R = 0.5 1.295 — 9.8953 —
R = 0.7 1.543 — 10.358 —
R = 1.0 1.620 1.633 12.962 1.3161
R = 1.0 (JPEG) 1.617 0.992 13.201 2.7112
R = 1.0 (Random) 1.487 0.329 41.315 40.216
R = 1.0 (Pixel) 1.566 0.351 14.733 10.156
We generate 1000 adversarial samples to evaluate AIEF.
Besides the FaceNet distance Dface, we also care about the
image perturbation in root mean square deviation (RMSD),
calculated by 1n‖x − xori‖2 for a n × n image. The average
numerical results are shown in Table 1. In the first three rows,
we vary the proportion of functional feature perturbation R.
That is, we only allow R ∗ 100% most effective features to
be modified. One would find that most samples become ad-
versarial ones when R > 0.5, which means only about 50%
features are required to be modified for a success attack.
For the last four rows, we set R = 1 to modify all fea-
tures and compare the results with PGD [Madry et al., 2018],
the strongest noise-based attack, in face of defense meth-
ods including JPEG compression [Liu et al., 2019], random
padding and resizing [Xie et al., 2018] (large distortion is
from the black padding), pixel deflection [Prakash et al.,
2018]. The attack iteration for PGD is also m = 100 and
its step length is 1. The results reveal that AIEF could mis-
lead FaceNet to produce samples that fool it to make extreme
false prediction (Dface over 1.6). The semantic perturbation
leads to a relatively large RMSD, but it has no impact on the
crucial parts of the image, so it is acceptable with no viola-
tion of the principle for attack. Noise-based attack could fool
FaceNet but their aggression could be mitigated by several
defense methods. But AIEF, which is based on features and
produce non-noise perturbations, could bypass those defense
methods.
4.2 AIEF on object classification
In this section, we put AIEF on another GAN structure for
a different task. Specifically, we take BigGAN (512*512
output, trained on ImageNet) as the decoder, ResNet152,
DenseNet121 and VGG19 as the victim model and conduct
AIEF on object classification. BigGAN has 128-D feature
input in the latent space, but the feature has no hierarchy as
StyleGAN. BigGAN could generate high resolution images
with high fidelity for a specified class in ImageNet. The of-
ficially public pre-trained model is capable of generating 4
classes of images, so we could only attack image in these
classes.
The prediction loss is specified as the output probability in
the original correct class as
L(fobj, x) = f
yori
obj (x), (4)
where yori is the original class ID. Adam learning rate is 0.01
for Limg and 0.1 for Lprd. We do not use the traditional MSE
or CrossEntropy training loss because attack aims for an in-
correct decision, not an incorrect output distribution.
The generated adversarial samples are shown in Figure 5.
Also, AIEF cheats various networks by producing semantic
perturbations and fools ResNet152 to predict on a completely
irrelevant class. The adversarial samples differ from the orig-
inal ones in background or shape, but the object remains in
the same class. Numerically, the overall success rate is higher
than 95% for three victim networks and the distortion is in the
same magnitude as face verification. However, here we could
not provide the success rate over the whole ImageNet, since
BigGAN is only capable of generating images in four Ima-
geNet classes.
Figure 5: AIEF on object classification. The first column is the orig-
inal clean samples. AIEF generates semantic perturbation in the sec-
ond column. The adversarial samples are in the third column. The
original objects are goldfinch, eagle, Blenheim spaniel and steel arch
bridge from top to bottom. The corresponding adversarial samples
contain the same objects, but are incorrectly predicted by ResNet152
as quill pen, stingray, chain saw and lacewing fly.
5 Conclusion
Traditional noise-based attack could not generate samples
with semantic perturbation, which however, is the strength
of feature-based attack. Current feature-based attacks are
restricted in low resolution because of the great number of
coupled features to express a high-resolution image. In this
paper, we address this issue by learning the weights for dif-
ferent features and are the first to conduct high resolution at-
tack. In the proposed Attack by Identifying Effective Features
(AIEF), effective features for attack are automatically learned
and identified during attack. Although they account for less
than 50% of the features, effective features have a significant
influence on fooling the victim network with an acceptable
distortion. Accordingly, one could select a proportion of the
most effective features to attack for a trade-off between at-
tack result and image distortion. By conducting experiments
on StyleGAN for face recognition and BigGAN for object
classification, we demonstrate that AIEF could be applied to
different generative models and attack on various tasks.
References
[Abadi et al., 2015] Martı´n Abadi, Ashish Agarwal, Paul
Barham, Eugene Brevdo, Zhifeng Chen, and Craig Citro
et al. TensorFlow: Large-scale machine learning on het-
erogeneous systems, 2015. Software available from ten-
sorflow.org.
[Brock et al., 2019] Andrew Brock, Jeff Donahue, and
Karen Simonyan. Large scale gan training for high fidelity
natural image synthesis. arXiv preprint arXiv:1809.11096,
2019.
[Carlini and Wagner, 2017] Nicholas Carlini and David
Wagner. Towards evaluating the robustness of neural
networks. In 2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy (SP), pages 39–57. IEEE, 2017.
[Chen et al., 2018] Pin-Yu Chen, Yash Sharma, Huan Zhang,
Jinfeng Yi, and Cho-Jui Hsieh. Ead: elastic-net attacks to
deep neural networks via adversarial examples. In Thirty-
second AAAI conference on artificial intelligence, 2018.
[Cohen et al., 2019] Jeremy M. Cohen, Elan Rosenfeld, and
J. Zico Kolter. Certified adversarial robustness via ran-
domized smoothing. In Proceedings of the 36th Interna-
tional Conference on Machine Learning, ICML 2019, 9-15
June 2019, Long Beach, California, USA, 2019.
[Creswell et al., 2017] Antonia Creswell, Anil A Bharath,
and Biswa Sengupta. Latentpoison-adversarial attacks on
the latent space. arXiv preprint arXiv:1711.02879, 2017.
[Deng et al., 2009] Jia Deng, Wei Dong, Richard Socher, Li-
Jia Li, Kai Li, and Li Fei-Fei. Imagenet: A large-scale
hierarchical image database. In 2009 IEEE Conference on
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition. IEEE, 2009.
[Dong et al., 2019] Yinpeng Dong, Tianyu Pang, Hang Su,
and Jun Zhu. Evading defenses to transferable adversarial
examples by translation-invariant attacks. In Proceedings
of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern
Recognition, pages 4312–4321, 2019.
[Ganin et al., 2016] Yaroslav Ganin, Evgeniya Ustinova,
Hana Ajakan, Pascal Germain, Hugo Larochelle, Franc¸ois
Laviolette, Mario Marchand, and Victor Lempitsky.
Domain-adversarial training of neural networks. Journal
of Machine Learning Research, 17(1):2096–2030, 2016.
[Goodfellow et al., 2014] Ian Goodfellow, Jean Pouget-
Abadie, Mehdi Mirza, Bing Xu, David Warde-Farley,
Sherjil Ozair, Aaron Courville, and Yoshua Bengio. Gen-
erative adversarial nets. pages 2672–2680, 2014.
[Goodfellow et al., 2015] Ian J Goodfellow, Jonathon
Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. Explaining and harnessing
adversarial examples. stat, 1050:20, 2015.
[He et al., 2016] Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing
Ren, and Jian Sun. Deep residual learning for image
recognition. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on
Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, pages 770–778,
2016.
[Huang et al., 2008] Gary B Huang, Marwan Mattar, Tamara
Berg, and Eric Learned-Miller. Labeled faces in the wild:
A database forstudying face recognition in unconstrained
environments. 2008.
[Huang et al., 2017] Gao Huang, Zhuang Liu, Laurens
van der Maaten, and Kilian Q. Weinberger. Densely con-
nected convolutional networks. In 2017 IEEE Conference
on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, CVPR 2017,
Honolulu, HI, USA, July 21-26, 2017, 2017.
[Ilyas et al., 2019] Andrew Ilyas, Shibani Santurkar, Dim-
itris Tsipras, Logan Engstrom, Brandon Tran, and Alek-
sander Madry. Adversarial examples are not bugs, they
are features. In Advances in Neural Information Process-
ing Systems 32: Annual Conference on Neural Information
Processing Systems 2019, NeurIPS 2019, 8-14 December
2019, Vancouver, BC, Canada, pages 125–136, 2019.
[Karras et al., 2017] Tero Karras, Timo Aila, Samuli Laine,
and Jaakko Lehtinen. Progressive growing of gans for
improved quality, stability, and variation. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1710.10196, 2017.
[Karras et al., 2019] Tero Karras, Samuli Laine, and Timo
Aila. A style-based generator architecture for generative
adversarial networks. In The IEEE Conference on Com-
puter Vision and Pattern Recognition, June 2019.
[Kingma and Ba, 2015] Diederik P. Kingma and Jimmy Ba.
Adam: A method for stochastic optimization. In 3rd Inter-
national Conference on Learning Representations, ICLR
2015, San Diego, CA, USA, May 7-9, 2015, Conference
Track Proceedings, 2015.
[Kingma and Welling, 2014] Diederik P Kingma and Max
Welling. Auto-encoding variational bayes. stat, 2014.
[LeCun et al., 2015] Yann LeCun, Yoshua Bengio, and Ge-
offrey Hinton. Deep learning. nature, 521, 2015.
[Liu et al., 2019] Zihao Liu, Qi Liu, Tao Liu, Nuo Xu, Xue
Lin, Yanzhi Wang, and Wujie Wen. Feature distillation:
Dnn-oriented JPEG compression against adversarial ex-
amples. In IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and
Pattern Recognition, CVPR 2019, Long Beach, CA, USA,
June 16-20, 2019, pages 860–868, 2019.
[Madry et al., 2018] Aleksander Madry, Aleksandar
Makelov, Ludwig Schmidt, Dimitris Tsipras, and
Adrian Vladu. Towards deep learning models resistant to
adversarial attacks. In 6th International Conference on
Learning Representations, ICLR, 2018.
[Paszke et al., 2019] Adam Paszke, Sam Gross, Francisco
Massa, Adam Lerer, James Bradbury, Gregory Chanan,
Trevor Killeen, Zeming Lin, Natalia Gimelshein, Luca
Antiga, et al. Pytorch: An imperative style, high-
performance deep learning library. In Advances in Neural
Information Processing Systems, pages 8024–8035, 2019.
[Prakash et al., 2018] Aaditya Prakash, Nick Moran,
Solomon Garber, Antonella DiLillo, and James Storer.
Deflecting adversarial attacks with pixel deflection. In
Proceedings of the IEEE conference on Computer Vision
and Pattern Recognition, pages 8571–8580, 2018.
[Salman et al., 2019] Hadi Salman, Jerry Li, Ilya P. Razen-
shteyn, Pengchuan Zhang, Huan Zhang, Se´bastien
Bubeck, and Greg Yang. Provably robust deep learning via
adversarially trained smoothed classifiers. In Advances in
Neural Information Processing Systems 32: Annual Con-
ference on Neural Information Processing Systems 2019,
2019.
[Schroff et al., 2015] Florian Schroff, Dmitry Kalenichenko,
and James Philbin. Facenet: A unified embedding for face
recognition and clustering. In Proceedings of the IEEE
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition,
2015.
[Shrivastava et al., 2017] Ashish Shrivastava, Tomas Pfister,
Oncel Tuzel, Joshua Susskind, Wenda Wang, and Russell
Webb. Learning from simulated and unsupervised images
through adversarial training. In Proceedings of the IEEE
Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition,
2017.
[Simonyan and Zisserman, 2015] Karen Simonyan and An-
drew Zisserman. Very deep convolutional networks for
large-scale image recognition. In 3rd International Con-
ference on Learning Representations, San Diego, CA,
USA, May 7-9, 2015, Conference Track Proceedings,
2015.
[Song et al., 2018] Yang Song, Rui Shu, Nate Kushman, and
Stefano Ermon. Constructing unrestricted adversarial ex-
amples with generative models. In Advances in Neural
Information Processing Systems, pages 8312–8323, 2018.
[Su et al., 2019] Jiawei Su, Danilo Vasconcellos Vargas, and
Kouichi Sakurai. One pixel attack for fooling deep neural
networks. IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computa-
tion, 2019.
[Szegedy et al., 2014] Christian Szegedy, Wojciech
Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Dumitru Er-
han, Ian J. Goodfellow, and Rob Fergus. Intriguing
properties of neural networks. In 2nd International
Conference on Learning Representations, ICLR 2014,
Banff, AB, Canada, April 14-16, 2014, Conference Track
Proceedings, 2014.
[Tang et al., 2019] Sanli Tang, Xiaolin Huang, Mingjian
Chen, Chengjin Sun, and Jie Yang. Adversarial attack type
I: Cheat classifiers by significant changes. IEEE Transac-
tions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 2019.
[Xie et al., 2018] Cihang Xie, Jianyu Wang, Zhishuai Zhang,
Zhou Ren, and Alan L. Yuille. Mitigating adversarial ef-
fects through randomization. In 6th International Confer-
ence on Learning Representations, 2018.
[Xie et al., 2019] Cihang Xie, Yuxin Wu, Laurens van der
Maaten, Alan L Yuille, and Kaiming He. Feature denois-
ing for improving adversarial robustness. In Proceedings
of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern
Recognition, pages 501–509, 2019.
[Zhang and Zhu, 2019] Tianyuan Zhang and Zhanxing Zhu.
Interpreting adversarially trained convolutional neural net-
works. In Proceedings of the 36th International Confer-
ence on Machine Learning, ICML 2019, 9-15 June 2019,
Long Beach, California, USA, pages 7502–7511, 2019.
